Author: Zhang Zhang

Abstract: Based on the unique governance tradition and political system, the Chinese government organization has gradually formed a compound bureaucracy which integrates value rationality and tool rationality, rather than the modern bureaucracy which is based on the legal theory in the West as described by Weber. This strong incentive system, based on democratic centralism and the unified civil service system, is managed by cadres' assessment, education and training, and administrative supervision. It has given Chinese government officials a strong incentive to implement the system, and given the Chinese government a strong ability to implement it. To a certain extent, it avoids the disadvantages of weak performance motivation, conformism, formalism and actually irresponsibility brought by the weak incentive system of western civil officials, but it also has the inherent contradictions of mutual influence between the political requirements and the business requirements of officials. How to deal with this contradiction has become the core issue in the design of incentive system for Chinese government officials. In practice, the Chinese government constantly adjusts the relative weight of political and business requirements for officials according to objective needs, so that officials' action direction is always consistent with the government's governance goals. After the reform and opening up, the motivation of the Chinese government officials to develop the economy and the demand for the political quality of the officials in the current stage of anti-corruption are the concrete reaction of this adjustment.

Key words: modern bureaucracy; Compound bureaucracy; Incentive system; Performance appraisal; Government governance;